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Governance is a concept that we can see “as the tra-
ditions and institutions by which authority in a coun-
try is exercised for the common good. This includes
(i) the process by which those authority [sic] are
selected,monitored and replaced,(ii) the capacity of
the government to effectively manage its resources
and implement sound policies,and (iii) the respect of
citizens and the state for the institutions that govern
economic and social interactions among them”
(World Bank 2010).According to Henisz the capaci-
ty of the government to implement policy change is
determined by the political institutions of a given po-
litical system.1 Political “institutions”include beneath
government branches (executive, legislative, judicia-
ry), administrations and other public authorities, the
constitution,rules of voting,majority rule or propor-
tional representation, as well as values and attitudes
concerning the management of collective problems.
Players and actors describe the operating stakehold-
ers in the political institutions, as president, govern-
ment, legislative chambers, courts, and in some cases
political parties.
The aim of Henisz is to explain the central role polit-
ical institutions (political structures) play and how
they constrain policy decisions. Policy constraints
influence the behaviour of players, their role and
their decision making and finally the change of poli-
cy. Henisz develops “a new measure of political con-
straints from a simple spatial model of political inter-
action that incorporates information on the number
of independent branches of government with veto
power and the distribution of preferences across and
within those branches” (Henisz 2000, 1). This mea-
sure is structurally derived and internationally com-
parable.
Henisz draws his theoretical findings on Tsebelis
(1995), who developed the “veto players” approach.
He concentrates on how political institutions influ-
ence the feasibility of changing status quo policy.The
innovative element in his approach is his focus on
the capacity of institutions to produce policy change.
“Veto players are individual or collective actors
whose agreement (by majority rule for collective ac-
tors) is required for a change of the status quo (pol-
icy)” (Tsebelis 1995, 289). With this new focus
Tsebelis can overcome the common distinctions
made in political science, especially in government
studies: between presidential and parliamentary sys-
tems or between two-party systems and multi-party
systems, etc.All political systems define which play-
ers must agree to change the status quo. This ap-
proach enables comparisons between different polit-
ical systems on a much broader basis than scientists
had before.
Elements of Henisz’ approach2
To construct a structurally-derived internationally
comparable measure of political constraints, the
structures of political systems are simplified by fo-
cusing on two elements which have a strong bearing
on the feasibility of policy change: “the number of
independent veto points over policy outcomes and
the distribution of preferences of the actors that in-
habit them “(Henisz 2000, 7).
* Ifo Institute for Economic Research at the University of Munich.
1A broader concept sees institutions as a core group of elements in
governance structures, as well as in all “branches” of the society.
They “are the rules of the game in a society … (they) are the
humanly devised constraints that shape human interaction”(North
1990,3).They fulfil the functions to reduce uncertainty and set con-
straints in everyday life as well as in economic, political, or any
other kind of interaction.
2 Detailed numerical results of Henisz’ measurements are in the
tables “Political Constraints Index III” and “Political Constraints
Index V” in the Folder Public Sector/Public Governance and
Law/Political and Administrative System of CESifo’s DICE
Database (www.cesifo-group/DICE).The political actors are: the executive, the lower
house of legislature, the upper house of legislature,
sub-federal units and judiciary. “Political actors will
be denoted by E (for executive),L1 (for lower house
of legislature), L2 (for upper house of legislature), F
(for sub-federal units) and J (for judiciary). Each
political actor has a preference,denoted by XI where
Iε [E, L1, L2, F, J].
“Assume,initially,that the status quo policy (X0) and
the preferences of all actors are independently and
identically drawn from a uniformly distributed uni-
dimensional policy space [0,1].The utility of political
actor I from a policy outcome X is assumed equal to
-|X-X1| and thus ranges from a maximum of 0 (when
X=X1) to a minimum of -1 (when X=0 and X1=1 or
vice versa)” (Henisz 2000, 7–8).
The number of veto players
Each actor has preferences and veto power over
final policy decisions. The constraints of every actor
for his future policy decisions are calculated “as one
minus the expected range of policies for which a
change in the status quo can be agreed upon by all
political actors with veto powers” (Henisz 2000, 8).
E.g., an unchecked government can always obtain
policy XE and therefore gain a maximum possible
utility of 0. For this case Henisz calculates the politi-
cal discretion which equals 1 and political constrains
(1 – political discretion) = 0.
The rise in the number of actors with independent
veto power is accompanied by an increase in the
level of political constraints. For instance, in a coun-
try with unicameral legislature (L1) the executive
needs a majority in the chamber in order to imple-
ment policy changes. The executive cannot guaran-
tee a special policy (XE) as the legislative can veto a
change from the status quo.
“Given the assumption that preferences are drawn
independently and identically from a uniform distri-
bution, the expected difference between the prefer-
ences of any two actors can be expressed as 1/(n+2)
where n is the number of actors” (Henisz 2000, 9). If
there are two political institutions with veto power
(e.g., the executive and a unicameral legislative) the
preferences lead to an expected preference differ-
ence ε equal to 1/(2+2) = 1/4.
There are six preference orderings possible, that
Henisz “will assume are equally likely to occur in
practice” (Hensiz 2000, 9; see Table 1). In the first
case (1) “no change in executive preferences yields a
change in policy”(Hensiz 2000,9).The executive has
the preference policy XE of 1/4 and therefore prefers
all policies between 1/2 – ε and 0 + ε to the status quo
(X0 = 1/2) and the legislature, which has the prefer-
ence of XLI = 3/4, prefers all policies between 1/2 + ε
and 1 – ε to X0.“As the executive and the legislature
cannot agree on a change in policy (because of dif-
ferent preferences), political discretion (the feasibil-
ity of policy change) equals 0 and political con-
straints equal 1” (Henisz 2000, 9). Policy change is
not possible in this case. The second model (2) has
the same result, but here the preferences for the
executive range between 1/2 and 1 and for the leg-
islative branch between 0 and 1/2. “In the remaining
orderings, both the executive and legislature agree
on a direction in which policy should move relative
to the status quo X0. These cases have closed form
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Table 1 
The six possible preference orderings of the game {XE, XLI} 
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solutions other than the status quo policy. Their
exact values depend on the assumption as to who
moves first (or last) and the relative costs of review
by each party”(Henisz 2000,9–10).“However … the
range of outcomes over which both parties can agree
to change the status quo is used as a measure of
political discretion. As this range expands, there
exists a larger set of policy changes preferred by both
political actors with veto power” (Henisz 2000, 10).
In case (3), the executive (XE = 1/2) prefers policies
between 1/4 + ε and 3/4 – ε to the status quo (1/4) and
the legislature (XL1 =  3/4) has a preference for all
policies greater than 1/4 + ε.“There exists a range of
policies approximately equal to 1/2 (between 1/4 + ε
and 3/4 – ε), which both actors agree are superior to
the status quo. The political discretion measure for
this ordering therefore equals 1/2 yielding a political
constraint measure also equal to 1/2.The same is true
in orderings (4), (5) and (6). The expected level of
the game {XE,X LI} based on the number of veto
points alone is the average of the political constraint
measures across six possible preference orderings:
(1 + 1 + 1/2 + 1/2 + 1/2 + 1/2)/6 = 2/3” (Henisz 2000, 10).
The preferences of the actors
This initial measurement of political constraint is
based purely on the number of veto points derived
from the constitutional frameset in a given polity
accompanied by the assumption of uniformly dis-
tributed preferences.But for Henisz that seems to be
very unrealistic and therefore the measurement of
political constraints described so far is supplemented
by information on the preferences of the different
actors.The different preferences are often results of
different party compilations of the government
branches.If in two (or more) political institutions the
same political parties “rule” there is an alignment
between these two (or more) institutions.In the case
of alignment Henisz sees the preferences as equal in
the two (or more respective) different institutions.
The “alignment (i.e., majority control of the execu-
tive and the legislature by the same party) would be
expected to expand the range of political discretion
and thereby reduce the level of political constraints”
(Henisz 2000, 10).The constraint measure would be
0 if the legislature and the executive were complete-
ly aligned (same majority), even if they both have
veto power (see Table 2).
Fractionalization of the legislature
“Further modifications are required when other
political actors are neither completely aligned with
nor completely independent from the executive”
(Henisz 2000, 11), as is the case in many democratic
systems. Here the composition of the parties in the
other branches of government (executive, legislative
chambers, judicial courts) is also relevant for the
level of constraints. Costs vary when managing large
homogeneous majorities or precarious majorities,
which additionally are heterogeneous or polarized
(and – in the latter – raises the le-
vel of political constraints). Le-
gislatures which are aligned with
the government and have large
homogenous majorities are less
expensive to manage and con-
trol. On the other hand “when
the executive is faced with an op-
position legislature, the level of
constraints is positively correlated
with the magnitude and concen-
tration of the legislative majority.
A heavily fractionalized opposition
with a precarious majority may
provide the executive with a lower
level of constraints due to the diffi-
culty in forming a cohesive legisla-
tive opposition bloc to any given
policy. Information on the partisan
alignment of different government
branches and on the difficulty of
forming a majority coalition with-
Table 2 
Political constraints assuming complete independence or alignment





branches) None (L1 or
L2) 
J  L1 &
L2
L & J L1 &
L2 & J
E  0
E, L1 2/3 0 
E, F 2/3 
E, J 2/3   0  
E, L1, F 4/5 2/3 
E, L1, L2 4/5 2/3  0 
E, L1, J 4/5 2/3 2/3  0 
E, L1, L2, F 13/15  4/5  2/3  
E, L1, F, J 13/15  4/5  4/5  2/3 
E, L1, L2, J 13/15 4/5  4/5  2/3  2/3  0 
E, L1, L2, F, J 19/21 13/15 13/15  4/5  4/5  2/3 
E: executive; – L1: lower legislature; – L2: upper legislature; – F: sub-federal,
– J: judiciary.
Source: Henisz (2000), 27.in them can therefore provide valuable information
as to the extent of political constraints” (Henisz
2000, 11).
To provide reliable values on the dimension of polit-
ical constraints to change policy Henisz includes the
extent of fractionalization of the legislature. “The
fractionalization of the legislature (or court) is
approximately equal to the probability that two ran-
dom draws from the legislature or court are from dif-
ferent parties” (Henisz 2000, 12).The formula is:
where:
n = number of parties
ni = number of seats held by ith party
N = total number of seats.
The value of political constraints for cases in which
executive and legislative are aligned is “thus equal to
the value derived under complete alignment (see
above) plus the fractionalization index multiplied by
the difference between independent and completely
aligned values” (Henisz 2000, 12; see Box). In cases
where the opposition controls the legislature the val-






























Henisz calculated the constraints and therefore also
the fractionalization for 157 countries in every year
from 1960 to 1994. For this calculation he needed
three types of data: the number of the institutional
(veto) players (actors) in a given polity; data on par-
tisan alignment across government branches (execu-
tive, legislative, judicative) and data on the party
composition of the legislatures.The results show,that
the most reliable institutional settings exist in “early
defectors of the British Empire (United States,
Australia, and Canada) and federal European states
(Belgium, and Germany)” (Henisz 2000, 13). The
weakest institutional settings with a high risk of fail-
ing are found in Sub-Saharan Africa and Paraguay.
Observation over time shows, that the largest
improvements took place in countries undergoing
democratic transitions.
The influence of checks and balances on political
volatility
Henisz amended his original approach (Henisz 2000)
by extending his investigation to include the political
institutions and the structure of the political decision
making system. To show how political institutions
and especially a system of checks and balances work,
he developed two arguments: The first is: “Checks
and balances on the discretion of policy-makers will
be positively associated with policy stability, ceteris
paribus” (Henisz 2004a, 7). And the second main-
tains that “Checks and balances on the discretion of
policy-makers will moderate the impact of macro-
economic shocks on policy outcomes” (Henisz
2004a, 7).
Checks and balances are the basis of democratic po-
litical systems. It is a system of separation of powers,
combined with mutual controls of the government
branches (checks), that prevents abuse of power for
the welfare of the system and the society as whole.
Therefore it is important that the separation of power
leads to a system in which branches check and bal-
ance each other, so that no branch has the power to
overrule the other branches (balance). One instru-
ment in this system is the veto power of the individual
players.It is only the balances that enable the individ-
ual government branches (powers) to use and defend
their competencies against the other individual gov-
ernment branches.This construct is part of the think-
ing of Rousseau and many other philosophers of the
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Modified calculation of political constraints 
First the measurement of political constraints:
As shown in Table 2 if the legislative is aligned
with the executive the constraint measure is 0. If
the government branches are completely inde-
pendent, for Henisz that means that there is no
alignment (the majority parties in executive
and legislature being completely different) the
political constraints measure would be
2/3.  
The second step is the calculation of the frac-
tionalization index, which is also needed for 
the calculation of political constraints. If the 
same party controls the executive and the le-
gislative and the fractionalization index equals
1/4 (which means that the executive has a large
or homogenous majority in the chamber), then
the modified constraint measure equals
 0 +
1/4 * (
2/3 – 0) =
1/6.  
In cases where the fractionalization index
equals
3/4 (precarious or heterogeneous major-
ity of the executive), this measure would equal
0 +
3/4 * (
2/3 – 0) =
1/2.  CESifo DICE Report 2/2010 57
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Enlightenment.The system was first used in the con-
stitution of the United States and is today a part of
the constitutions in many democratic countries.
Two measures of the checks and balances on policy-
makers discretion are used by Henisz. The first
approach mentioned by Henisz – based on Beck et al.
(2001,170) – “counts the number of veto players in a
political system, adjusting for whether these veto play-
ers are independent of each other, as determined by
the level of electoral competitiveness in a system,
their respective party affiliations, and the electoral
rules.” This index (CHECKS2A) increases linearly
with the addition of further veto points and has dif-
ferent methodologies for presidential and parliamen-
tary systems. In a presidential system if the presi-
dents’ party and the majority party in at least one
chamber are the same than the president is not count-
ed as a check. In parliamentary systems it is similar:
additional points for the prime minister and every
chamber (the number of checks increases), the same
reduction if the party (or coalition of parties) of the
prime minister is the majority party in at least one
chamber (the number of checks decreases). Also as
the number of checks changes, the balance changes.
Thus constellations are possible in which some play-
ers dominate others because of same preferences
(party membership).This index takes into account the
relationship between veto players (here called veto
points) and “it also assumes a linear relationship be-
tween the number of adjusted veto points and the
degree of constraints on policy change. Similarly, the
number of …veto points increases linearly in Parlia-
mentary systems with each addition of a party to the
ruling coalition without regard to the relative size of
the parties in the coalition” (Henisz 2004a, 9).
As an alternative measure Henisz introduced the
Political Constraints Index POLCONV. It begins
similarly by assigning countries without veto points
with the lowest score and “relies upon a simple spa-
tial model of political interaction to derive the extent
to which any one political actor or the replacement
for any one actor – e.g., the executive or a chamber
of the legislature – is constrained in his or her choice
of future policies” (Henisz 2004a, 9). He starts with
the identification of the number of independent bran-
ches of government which have veto power over pol-
icy change. “The preferences of each of these bran-
ches and the status quo policy are then assumed to
be independently and identically drawn from a uni-
form, uni-dimensional policy space.This assumption
allows for the derivation of a quantitative measure
of institutional constraints using a simple spatial
model of political interaction”(Henisz 2004a,10).By
using data on the party composition of the govern-
ment and every legislative chamber, this initial mea-
sure is modified.With this modification Henisz tries
to show the extent of alignment across branches of
government. In his opinion this alignment increases
the feasibility of policy change and reduces the level
of political constraints (and reduces consequently
the number of political checks). The next modifica-
tion involves capturing the extent of preference het-
erogeneity within the legislative branches. For the
author a greater heterogeneity within the branches
increases the costs of overturning policy for aligned
branches. POLCONV “does show diminishing mar-
ginal returns to the addition of subsequent veto
points and the functional form of those diminishing
returns is not arbitrary but rather derived from the
spatial model” (Henisz 2004a, 10).The addition of a
new party to a coalition is examined rather as an im-
pact on the fractionalization of the legislature than
as a new veto player.
Henisz shows the importance of institutional checks
and balances on the discretion of policy-makers for
the stability of a policy. He concludes that “the con-
ventional wisdom that holds that political and insti-
tutional checks and balances that constrain policy-
makers’ discretion serve to limit policy volatility and
thus encourage investment and economic growth ap-
pears well founded. In particular, non-conventional
forms of revenue generation and capital expenditure
appear particularly sensitive to the structure of a na-
tion’s political institutions” (Henisz 2004a, 17).
Political constraints in the US
Obviously the structure of the political system con-
strains policy making. But how are the political con-
straints calculated? Here an example that demon-
strates how the values derived from the POLCON
index of Henisz are generated: In 1990 both legisla-
tive chambers were controlled in the US by the De-
mocrats while the Republican Party had control over
the executive branch.“Were the two legislative cham-
bers completely controlled by separate opposition par-
ties, the political constraint measure would equal 0.90
(E,L1,L2,F,J = 19/21).Were they completely controlled
by a single opposition party, the political constraint
measure would be 0.87 (E,L,F,J = 13/15).If both cham-
bers were completely aligned with the executive the
measure would be 0.80 (E, F, J = 4/5). However, as thesame opposition party controlled both legislatures and
the fractionalization index equalled 0.48 and 0.50, the
final value of political constraints (POLCON) equals
0.80 + [((1 – 0.48)/2 + (1 – 0.50)/2) * (0.87 – 0.80)] =
0.83”3 (Henisz 2000, 23–24). The index used for this
example measures the number of veto players, their
preferences,the alignment (or independence) between
them and the fractionalization index.The results show
that the decision making process in the United States is
restrictive.
Rational choice as basis for decisions
One of the main criticisms of Henisz’s approach is
that he does not pay that much attention to the stra-
tegic (ideological) and power gaining strategies of
the players (Schmidt 2004, Zohlnhöfer 2003). As
Henisz and Tsebelis have deduced their approaches
from the rational choice theory,they assume rational
behaviour on the part of all players. Players try to
maximize benefit-cost-ratios in their decisions. For
the critics, Henisz’s players make their rational deci-
sions based entirely on structures and their con-
straints. Zohlnhöfer argues that in the United King-
dom,for instance,there is only one formal veto play-
er. Policy changes should be – according to Henisz –
very easy to enact (if the prime minister is in a strong
position and can convince or discipline enough mem-
bers of parliament).But the pressure from society and
the parties’ strategies to gain or retain power some-
times impede reforms: the party interested in insti-
tuting reform must provide reasons for and defend
the reform to the voters.That fact “disciplines”many
politicians and discourages them from initiating
reforms.
This criticism seems to be right in one respect.
Henisz investigates primarily the structures of polit-
ical systems.But he also includes in his approach the
preferences of the players in the process of decision
making. The preferences may be oriented towards
solving problems but they may also be based on tac-
tical considerations, ideologies and power-gaining
strategies. Obviously, however, Henisz cannot mea-
sure to what extent political decisions are motivated
by problem-solving objectives or by tactical,ideolog-
ical or power-related reasons.
What about interest groups? 
Up to this point the focus was primarily on veto
players “within” the political system. For the dis-
putes within the society interest groups play an im-
portant role.They have a strong impact on policy as
they are intermediate entities between their mem-
bers and collective players, especially the different
government branches.And as the essence of the po-
litical process is to gain or to retain power the actors
in the political processes have a very strong interest
in both being informed about the society by the in-
terest groups and spreading propaganda for govern-
ment policy using the transmission channels of the
interest groups. Some interest groups have great in-
fluence on people’s beliefs and therefore it is impor-
tant for the political actors not to alienate the opin-
ions of these interest groups. In contrast, to pursue
special policies it is very helpful for them to find a
partner in the affected interest groups.Obviously in-
terest groups have an impact on every kind of politi-
cal decision. They also influence the preferences of
political institutions to a certain extent.
However interest groups per se do not determine poli-
cy outcomes.“The formal institutional structure of the
policymaking process may facilitate or impede interest
groups’ attainment of their preferred policy” (Henisz
2004b,9–10).The structure may influence the extent of
pressure that the groups can bear on policy (-makers)
and also the possibilities of the policymaker to respond
to the pressure of the interest groups.Henisz concludes
“that policymaking structures with more veto points
reduce the degree to which political actors are sensitive
to interest group pressures relative to structures with
fewer veto points”(Henisz 2004b,11).However,Henisz
cannot measure how strong the influence of interest
groups is on specific political decisions.
What else matters for decision making?
The most important player in the preparation and
also the implementation of political decisions is the
bureaucracy, which does not refer so much to the
Weberian ideal of “legal and rational leadership”but
to the administrative organization.Its employees de-
sign draft bills and decrees, and they are responsible
for the application of the laws and decrees after they
have passed. Bureaucracies have powerful positions
in political systems. Unfortunately Henisz did not
examine the role of the administration in the process
of policy change.
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3 The political constraints index POLCON equals: the value for
political constraints derived under complete alignment (0.80) plus
the fractionalization index [(1-0.48)/2 + (1-0.50)/2] multiplied by
the difference between independent and completely aligned values
(0,87-0,80). Reversed values because the opposition controls the
legislature.CESifo DICE Report 2/2010 59
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In contrast Tsebelis’ veto player approach can be ex-
panded to include, among others, the influence of
bureaucracies. One main point to consider is the in-
dependence of bureaucracies. For Tsebelis the num-
ber of veto players is decisive. “Single veto players
do not need detailed descriptions of bureaucratic
procedures written into law” (Tsebelis 1995, 324).
The party in power can decide how the administra-
tive organization is going to work. The government
has no reason for legal procedures to rule the bu-
reaucracy.Also writing down the rules for the future
makes no sense in such a system. The next govern-
ment can change everything the moment they come
to power.The absence of laws to control the bureau-
cracy and the fact, that only one agent leads it, will
probably result in a lack of independence.
If there are multiple veto players, they “will try to
crystallize the balance of forces at the time they write
a law, in order to restrict bureaucracies as much as
they can” (Tsebelis 1995, 324). The restrictiveness of
rules and regulations for the bureaucracy depends on
the agreement between the veto players. In cases,
where the veto players disagree politically and also
procedurally, the law concerning the bureaucracy can
be more general and can give “leeway to the bureau-
crats”(Tsebelis 1995,324).There is – even if there are
multiple veto players – no guarantee that detailed
procedural descriptions will be written into law.
Tsebelis concludes that systems with multiple veto
players tend to have more cumbersome bureaucratic
procedures than systems with one single veto player.
“Cumbersome bureaucratic procedures should not be
confounded with lack of independence; in fact, they
might be a weapon of bureaucrats against political
interference in their tasks” (Tsebelis 1995, 324). But
in all bureaucracies there is strong expertise on the
part of the civil servants.In this respect their influence
is considerable and is not dependent on the regula-
tions they are subject to.A long-standing civil servant
in a governmental agency is normally very familiar
with the topics of his department and therefore has a
superior knowledge in comparison with a new min-
istry or secretary of the department.The civil servant
can use this advantage to help the new head of the
department or to follow his own interests. His influ-
ence is tremendous. Another phenomenon has re-
cently arisen in the realm of lobbyism: particular in-
terest groups endeavour to place their employees in
the bureaucracy. Once they are in, the new civil ser-
vants can work towards implementing the ideas of
their “former” (and probably next) employer.
Summary
Veto players (Tsebelis) or veto points (Henisz) pro-
vide a reasonable approach to explaining the con-
straints on political decisions. Both approaches are
focused on the players with real veto power. These
players are able to change the status quo or prevent
change. By counting the number of the veto play-
ers/veto points, by watching their cohesion and con-
gruence, it is possible to determine the process of
change. Even the critics of the veto player approach
concede that it contributes to the understanding of
these processes and constraints (even if they cannot
fully explain it). Obviously in economics the counting
of veto points is not enough to explain the political
constraints of decision-making.The critics are correct,
but Henisz does not restrict his approach to counting.
By including preferences he implicitly considers the
ideological and also the power-gaining and power-
retaining aspects of political decisions.Henisz delivers
a tool that elucidates the constraints inherent in the
political structure.The approach contributes to an un-
derstanding of the basic pattern of decision making in
different political systems and is “valid” for economic
policy as well as other policy fields.
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